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Abstract
Relying on a simple endogenous growth model, this paper highlights a political insta-
bility eﬀect as a potential explanation for why foreign aid is frequently ineﬀective with
respect to economic performance. In the present framework, the role of the state is to
fund institutions allowing for ongoing technology adoption and hence long-run growth.
However, providing a self-interested government with additional resources to fill a possi-
ble ”financing gap” may not result in better institutions. More money in the hands of
the regime fuels conflict over the distribution of the funds - and decreases the incumbent
regime’s time horizon in oﬃce. With a shorter time horizon, it is less attractive to finance
good institutions whose returns mainly accrue in the future. Panel data evidence points
indeed to a sizable causal eﬀect of foreign aid on political instability in the 1980s and
1990s.
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1 Introduction
After more than three decades of empirical research, it is probably fair to say that we do not
find a robust positive impact of foreign aid on economic development.1 This observation leads
to some natural questions: Why do even substantial aid flows frequently fail to push recipient
countries on a steeper growth path? Why is it that even in countries with good policies aid
does not generate the desired results? Answering these questions will be crucial to the success
of future aid eﬀorts; without a better knowledge of why aid did not work in the past, ambitious
development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals cannot be reached.
The present paper tries to shed light on the forces undermining aid eﬀectiveness by con-
structing a political-economy model that captures frequent characteristics of poor countries.
We focus on an economy that may grow through the adoption of more productive technologies
from abroad. The role of the state is to enable an ongoing technology transfer by enforcing
contracts between domestic producers and the foreign suppliers of technology; a higher funding
of the judiciary translates into better enforcement and, through this channel, allows for faster
adoption and growth. The state, however, is taken to be economically weak in the sense that
it has only limited power to tax so that the government’s budget is only small.
With regard to politics, we assume that there are only little checks on executive authority
so that the incumbent government - or, synonymously, the ”ruler” - has substantial leeway to
divert public resources for its own benefit. However, an incumbent ruler’s oﬃce and power
may be challenged from time to time. The citizens can force the incumbent ruler out of oﬃce
by taking part in an insurrection which allows them to appropriate the current state budget.
We say that the executive is politically weak if the conditions for a successful insurrection are
frequently met so that the ruler is replaced more often along the equilibrium path.
Although highly stylized, these assumptions reflect important aspects of the economic
and political systems in aid-depending countries. Many growth theorists (e.g., Parente and
Prescott, 1994; Hall and Jones, 1999; Aghion et al., 2005) emphasize the role of productivity
in accounting for international GDP per capita diﬀerences, and there seems to be a consensus
that ”good” institutions fascilitate the continuos adoption of more productive technologies in
low-income countries.2 Similarly, it is widely held by political scientists (e.g., Herbst, 2000;
1See Rajan and Subramanian (2005) for a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the aid-growth relationship.
See also Kraay (2006) for an assessment of the relative importance of international aid in growth regressions.
2The view that ”bad” institutions are a major obstacle to technology adoption has also a long tradition in
development economics. Schultz (1964), for instance, argues that agricultural productivity in poor countries is
so low because certain institutional arrangements prevent the use of science-based modern farming methods.
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Bates, 2001) that a limited capacity to tax is one of the key characteristics of poor economies.
However, while a typical state’s ability to generate revenues is rather low, the incumbent gov-
ernments are barely constrained on how these revenues are spent. Take Sub-Saharan Africa
(where most of international aid goes to) as an example. Ever since the early 1960s, a typical
Sub-Saharan government has faced only slight limitations on executive authority (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2005; Polity IV data set).3 Finally, although only slightly limited in oﬃce, the
executives tend to be weak in the sense that they are often forced out of power in an unlawful
manner. Sub-Saharan Africa serves again as an example. Since the 1960s, the average coun-
try has seen 2.5 forced government changes per ten years (Cross-National Time-Series Data
Archive). So it appears that a long series of coups and insurrections has continuously brought
new regimes into power - without moving the typical African county towards more democracy
and better executive control.
The present set-up generates two interesting results. First, as compared to a benchmark
democracy-case, the dictatorial regime significantly under-invests into the judicial system so
that, without foreign budget assistance, the country largely fails to adopt more productive
technologies. With a low ability to raise taxes, the regime can only capture a small fraction of
the benefits associated with growth-promoting institutions. Put diﬀerently, the self-interested
ruler perceives a low return from funding the judicial system and hence consumes a large
fraction of the state revenues. The second result is that foreign aid in the form of budget
assistance may not induce the ruler to provide substantially better institutions. There are
two competing eﬀects of aid. On the one hand, to increase his future revenue base, the ruler
has incentives to spend some of the additional resources on growth-promoting institutions;
this is the positive income eﬀect of budget assistance to which advocates of foreign aid (e.g.,
Sachs, 2005) may refer to when arguing that foreign aid will fill a ”financing gap.” On the
other hand, as already pointed out by Grossman (1992), there is a negative political instability
eﬀect. With more resources in the hands of the regime, the citizens’ incentives to take part
in an insurrection are stronger so that, other things equal, the incumbent government is more
often forced out of power along the equilibrium path. Hence, with a higher level of budget
assistance, the current ruler faces a lower probability of benefiting from the future returns to
today’s investment. It turns out that the income eﬀect is stronger at lower aid levels while the
instability eﬀect dominates at higher levels so that the relationship between foreign aid and
institutional quality or growth is likely to follow an inverted-U pattern. The range in which aid
3During 1960-99 period, the average country’s level of executive constraint was slightly below 3, where 3
indicates that there are some real but limited constraints (1 denotes the worst, 7 the best score).
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promotes economic performance depends on the government’s political and economic strength.
The more insurgency is favored through, for instance, rough terrain or foreign logistic support,
the stronger the instability eﬀect and hence the more limited the scope for beneficial external
assistance; similarly, the higher the ruler’s rents in absence of aid (because a strong primary
export sector facilitates taxation, for instance), the more damaging even higher, aid-induced
political instability and hence the narrower the range in which aid works.
Recent events in Chad, a poor central African country, provide a telling example of such
an aid-induced instability eﬀect. Since 2003, when the revenues from an oil pipeline project
(which was set-up by the World Bank) started to flow in, political instability has surged. The
incumbent president now even faces threats from sub-clans of his own people ”who feel they
are getting too few of the presidential favours (The Economist, March 2, 2006).” It is clear
that this increase in instability induced the regime in December 2005 to abolish agreements
on the allocation of oil revenues; the government spends now much more resources without
international oversight - which means that the money goes largely to the regime’s cronies.
Tragically, the quality of the public services has even fallen in recent times. Meanwhile, the
dictator has not to worry about future sanctions because, as a Swiss newspaper puts it, ”most
likely, the regime’s time horizon in power is only short (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, December 31,
2005).” While the Chadian example is only an anecdotal illustration, more systematic evidence
in favor of an instability eﬀect can be found in the data. Using a panel data model, we find in
the 1980s and 1990s a positive causal eﬀect of oﬃcial development assistance on the frequency
of forced government changes.
The present paper may help to explain several puzzling findings in the empirical literature.
First, it provides an explanation for why the literature has failed to identify a robust and sizable
positive impact of aid on growth. Our model emphasizes that - under relevant conditions -
an unintended side eﬀect of large aid inflows, a surge in political instability, prevents the
governments form spending a large part of the additional resources productively. So the positive
impact of aid is probably too small to be consistently identified across diﬀerent specifications,
estimation methods, or data sets. Second, the model explains the decreasing returns to aid
which have been identified in some recent empirical studies. The explanation is that the aid-
induced instability eﬀect becomes very strong as the level of lootable government resources
rises. Third, the model delivers a rational for why foreign aid seems not to work better in
countries with better economic institutions or policies. In the present framework, the quality
of institutions or policies is endogenous, and a large inflow of resources easily destroys a fragile
equilibrium in which comparatively good institutions prevail.
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Our theory is closely related to work by Grossman (1992) and Acemoglu et al. (2004) who
analyze the impact of foreign aid on regime stability. Yet, while these two contributions focus in
great detail on the role of the technology of insurrection or the strength of political institutions,
the present model centers around the impact of aid-induced instability on long-run economic
performance. In this sense, the present paper is part of a small literature that incorporates
foreign aid into models of economic growth. Earlier papers in this literature are generally based
on Harrod-Domar type models (e.g., Chenery and Strout, 1966) whereas latter contributions
rely on the neoclassical framework (e.g., Boone, 1996; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001) or on
the OLG model (e.g., Dalgaard et al., 2004). While the existing models diﬀer in terms of
technology, demographic structure or the form of government, they share one common feature:
the focus is on the impact of aid on growth via capital accumulation. We deviate from the
literature by analyzing how aid might aﬀect institutional quality and, through this channel, the
rate of technology adoption. Other related work consists of papers by Svensson (2000a, 2000b)
and Collier and Dollar (2004), among others. These papers do not explicitly address economic
growth but also explore channels through which foreign aid may deteriorate economic policy.
The conjectures are that foreign aid may partially substitute for sound economic policies,
or that large aid payments induce wasteful rent-seeking activities. Neither of these authors,
however, addresses the issue of aid-induced instability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. In
Section 3, we characterizes the equilibrium under personal rule and establish that, as compared
to a democracy-benchmark, institutional quality is lower in the former case. Section 4 analyzes
the impact of foreign aid on political instability, institutional quality, and growth. Section 5
discusses an interesting variation of the technology of insurrection. In Section 6, we present
panel data evidence for aid-induced political instability in poorer developing countries. Section
7 concludes.
2 Description of the Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
This subsection lays out the basic components of our model. We start by defining the two
groups in society, the producers and the ruling elite (Social structure and political power)
and then discuss the transition of political power between consecutive regimes (Technology of
insurrection). The next step is to specify how output is generated and to characterize the role
of the state in promoting economic growth (Production technology and technology adoption).
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It follows a description of the state’s revenue sources and of how government spending improves
the economy’s growth potential (Taxes, foreign aid, and public spending). Finally, we lay down
the timing of events (Time-line).
Social structure and political power. We consider an infinite-horizon economy. Time
is discrete and indexed by t. The economy consists of a continuum 1 + γ of individuals,
where γ is arbitrarily small but positive number. All individuals’ preferences are given by the
intertemporal utility function
Ujt = E
( ∞X
s=0
βs ln cjt+s
)
, (1)
where cjt refers to consumption of agent j at date t and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor.
There are two types of individuals. Agents on the interval [0, 1] are called ”producers;” the
remaining individuals belong to a ruling elite. Throughout the paper, the index i denotes
producers while the members of the elite are indexed by R. Since the members of elite are
identical in all relevant aspects, it will be convenient to threat them as one agent; hence we
refer to the ruling class simply as the ”ruler” or the ”dictator.”
The ruler is self-interested and decides on economic policies such as taxing output (which
is generated by the producers) and investing into growth-promoting institutions. In power,
the ruler can ignore the wishes of the remaining population but can instead choose economic
policies that maximize his own utility. There are no formal political institutions such as a
constitution or electoral rules placing binding constraints on his behavior.
Technology of insurrection. However, although the unchallanged ruler may implement
the policies he prefers, his rule may be threatened from time to time. At the beginning of each
period t, the producers can force the current ruler out of oﬃce by taking part in an insurrection.
The individual options are summarized by rit ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 indicating participation, and we
define the probability of of taking part, uit ∈ [0, 1], as a producer’s relevant choice variable. The
insurrection is ”successful” if the fraction of participating individuals, πt ≡
R 1
0
ritdi, exceeds
some threshold level πmin < 1. In that case, the current ruler receives zero continuation utility
and is replaced by an identical new ruler in the following period, t + 1. We may think that
defeated ruler is forced into exile while the new one, entering the scene from abroad, exploits
political turmoil to size power at home. The important point is that an insurrection does not
alter the form of government so that “the new government is very much like the one before
(Tullock, 1971, p. 98)” - which seems to match the African experience since the early 1960s.
The insurrection threat, however, is only transitory. If πt < πmin, the ruler stays in power and
is unchallenged for the rest of the period. In particular, he is free to choose the policies he
6
prefers most.
In modeling the individual participation decision we assume that the producers’ behavior
is only influenced by the private benefits and costs of participation. A successful insurrection
provides the insurgents with access to the government’s revenue sources in period t. They
can appropriate the foreign aid payment and may use the state apparatus to extract taxes
to an extent that would have stood open to the unchallenged ruler. It is further maintained
that these revenues are equally distributed among the insurgents. Moreover, since in case
of a successful insurrection the current government is shut-down and all public resources are
appropriated by the revolters, there is no productive investment during the rest of the period.
So, in the present set-up, it is less appropriate to think of the insurgents as a well organized
opposition movement aiming at bringing a better government into power. Here, the insurgents
are rather interested in a (temporary) access to the government’s budget and, as in Tullock
(1971), the overthrow of the incumbent regime can be seen as a necessary byproduct.
The private cost of participation is assumed to be a factor θt times the current firm revenue,
where θt is a non-negative i.i.d. random variable with a continuous distribution function F
which satisfies the standard monotone hazard rate condition
d
dx
µ
f(x)
1− F (x)
¶
≥ 0. (A1)
Making the cost proportional to the firm revenue ensures that the former grows pari passu with
the average income and hence the ruler’s resources which is necessary to have a balance growth
path. The fact that θ fluctuates mirrors the notion that, as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000),
some periods may be more conducive to insurrections than others; moreover, treating θ as a
random variable allows us to model the idea that, as in the Chadian example, the ruler faces
uncertainty with respect to his time-horizon in oﬃce. In what follows we say that the ruler is
politically weak if, for given government revenues, the conditions for a successful insurrection
are frequently met; as will become clear below, this is either the case if the probability of
”low-cost” realizations is high or if πmin is small.4
Production technology and technology adoption. Each producer i has access to a
linear production technology that allows to produce Xit units of the unique non-storable final
good with one unit of labor. For ease of notation, assume that the producers’ labor endowment
is normalized to unity so that firm i’s revenue in period t is simply given by Xit.
4 Implicitly, the present set-up rules out investment into oppression. Yet, allowing the ruler to fund measures
of counter-insurgency does not alter the model’s main implications as long as the repression technology is
suﬃciently ineﬃcient. See Grossman (1992) for an analysis of such a model.
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After production has taken place, each producer decides on improving the productivity level
of his firm. Specifically, there are foreign firms oﬀering ”technology transfers” at an exogenous
price of χ per additional unit of future productivity (and per unit of labor). Hence, a producer
incurs a cost of χ∆Xit+1 when deciding to advance the level of productivity from Xit to Xit+
∆Xit+1 = Xit+1.5 So, as in Parente and Prescott (1994) or Aghion et al. (2005), technology
adoption is the engine of growth in the present framework, and a country remains economically
”underdeveloped” when the firms continuously fail to implement more productive technologies
(that are developed abroad). Obviously, independently of other factors or circumstances, the
producers will not invest into future technology if either the cost of technology adoption is
excessively high or if the weight of future consumption is very low. To avoid this uninteresting
case, we impose the parameter restriction
β
2
− (1− β)χ > 0. (A2)
Yet, even if technology adoption is very attractive, the producers may fail to substantially
increase productivity between two periods. The reason is an enforcement problem. Each
producer i is free to default on the payment obligation specified in the current technology-
adoption contract. The producer’s decision to default is denoted by dit ∈ {0, 1}, with 1
indicating breach of contract. Breaking a contract, however, is not free of charge. Specifically,
the cost of default is taken to be a fraction λt of the current firm revenue, Xit; other sanctions
- such as exclusion from technology adoption in the future - are ruled out.6 The level of λt
- which will be determined by the investment into the judicial system as described further
below - mirrors how well the legal system works. If λt is ”low,” the legal system is relatively
ineﬀective since a defaulter can avoid contract enforcement at low cost, and vice versa.
We further assume that each producer i defaults whenever it is in his interest to do so, i.e.,
whenever dit = 1 maximizes his net income, yit ≡ Xit − (1 − dit)χ∆Xit+1 − ditλtXit, given
λt, Xit, and ∆Xit+1. It follows that a contract is incentive compatible (and may therefore be
implemented) if χ∆Xit+1 ≤ λtXit, or, equivalently, if the condition
git+1 ≤
λt
χ
, (2)
is satisfied, where git+1 denotes firm i’s productivity growth rate between t and t + 1. The
intuition behind equation (2) is straightforward. Other things equal, better contract enforce-
ment (i.e., a higher λt) allows the producers to grow faster since they can credibly commit to
5 In what follows, we implicitly assume that, in steady state, the productivity levels Xit do not grow faster
than the world technology frontier, Xt.
6 See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Matsuyama (2000) for models of imperfect credit contract enforcement
in a similar spirit.
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make the substantial payments associated with large productivity increases. A higher χ, by
contrast, reduces a producer’s growth potential because the incentives to default are stronger
when the cost of technology adoption is higher, other things equal.
For the rest of this paper we assume that there are no diﬀerences in initial productivity
levels, [Xi0]i∈[0,1] . Since the producers are equal in all other respects too, the incentives to
invest do not diﬀer among producers so that the productivity levels are identical in all future
periods as well. Accordingly, we have
Xt ≡
Z 1
0
Xitdi = Xit
with t ≥ 0, where Xt denotes aggregate output at date t.
Taxes, foreign aid, and public spending. In each period t, the incumbent ruler can
set a linear tax rate τ t on net income. The state, however, has only a limited capacity to
tax. Specifically, we assume that the ruler cannot implement a tax rate higher than τ ,7 and
we say that the state is economically weak if τ is comparatively low. Though highly stylized,
the limited-tax assumption reflects what many political scientists consider to be a central
characteristic of poor economies. Moreover, a low ability to generate revenues typically serves
as a rational for external support in the form of budget assistance — which is the second source
of state revenues. In each period, the government receives an aid payment worth a fraction α
of the current aggregate output. For expositional convenience, we impose an upper bound on
foreign assistance:
α ≤ 1. (A3)
The aid payment is assumed to flow independently of the government’s behavior. The justifi-
cation is that, in practice, donors seem to be reluctant to curb aid flows when conditions are
not met. An alternative is to interpret this second revenue source as the recurrent payoﬀ from
a large development project that, once set up, continuously generates income. A convenient
example would be the Chadian pipeline project that was initiated by the World Bank.
Beside setting the tax rate, the unchallanged ruler has to determine to what extent gov-
ernment revenues are used to finance growth-enhancing institutions. Specifically, the ruler
can increase λt by funding the judicial system. In explicitly assuming that it is costly to run
institutions enforcing private contracts we follow a line of thought that goes back at least to
Demsetz’ (1967) contribution on property rights. For concreteness, we assume that λt rises
7For instance, suppose that the producers can “hide” net income, but lose a fraction τ when doing so. Then,
the relevant tax range is [0, τ ].
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one-to-one in the fraction of the aggregate output devoted to judiciary, σt, so that
λt = σt. (3)
Normalizing expenditures by the aggregate output ensures the existence of a balanced growth
path. Moreover, such a formulation seems to be reasonable since the number of cases tends to
rise in the population size and, in order to maintain a certain quality, wages in the judiciary
have to grow pari passu with the per capita income.
It remains to discuss the government’s budget constraint. We impose that the credit mar-
ket is inexistent so that the incumbent ruler cannot go into debt (the same applies for the
producers). Then, since the unique output good is non-storable, the incumbent ruler has to
determine taxes and expenses subject to budget constraint
σtXt ≤ αXt + τ t
Z 1
0
yitdi. (4)
If expression (4) is a strict inequality, the budget surplus is is appropriated (and eventually
consumed) by the ruler.
Time-line. The exact timing of events within each period is as follows: (i) the citizens
inherit their productivity level, [Xit]i∈[0,1], and production takes place; (ii) the producers learn
the cost of participating in an insurrection, θt, and choose the probability of participation,
[uit]i∈[0,1] . In case of a successful insurrection (πt ≥ πmin), the ruler is forced out of oﬃce, the
maximum tax rate is set, and the insurgents appropriate all state revenues; finally, all producers
consume their net incomes, and no further actions are taken within this period. Otherwise, if
πt < πmin, the period continues in the following way: (iii) the ruler sets the tax rate, τ t, and
determines the funding of the judicial system, σt; (iv) the producers announce to what extent
the productivity level is increased, [git+1]i∈[0,1] ; (v) the foreign firms decide to transact or not
in each case; eventually, the producers decide whether to default or not, consumption takes
place, and the period ends.
2.2 Equilibrium Concept and Period Payoﬀs
In order to discuss the possible strategies and payoﬀs at each date it is convenient to stick to
the following convention. In case an insurrection takes place, government spending, σt, and
the tax rate, τ t, are no longer in the incumbent ruler’s choice set; under these circumstances,
the two variables are defined to be 0 and τ , respectively.
Equilibrium concept. The focus of the analysis will be on the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(MPE), where strategies depend only on the payoﬀ relevant states and on prior actions within
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the same period. The relevant state variables are given by (Xit, θt) in case of the producers and
by (Xt, θt) in case of the ruler. The characterization of the equilibrium below can be simplified
by exploiting an important feature of the model. Anticipating that each producer i will default
on the payment obligation if git+1 > λt/χ, the technology suppliers would never agree on such
a contract. Knowing this, the producers do not try to to advance the productivity level by
more than λt/χ, and we can focus on git+1 ≤ λt/χ so that the foreign firms always contract and
default never occurs. Then, the economy can be represented as a dynamic game between the
incumbent ruler and the producers, and the equilibrium is summarized by a set of strategies,³
[uit(Xit, θt)]i∈[0,1] , τ t(Xt, θt), σt(Xt, θt), [git+1(Xit, θt)]i∈[0,1]
´
,
at each date t. In order to simplify notation we do not indicate that strategies may depend on
actions already taken within the same period.
Period payoﬀs. Since the final good is non-storable and the credit market is absent,
all agents just consume period incomes minus expenses. If there has not been a successful
insurrection (πt < πmin), a producer’s consumption level equals net income minus taxes (minus
the private cost of rioting if rit = 1). Using ∆Xit+1 = git+1Xit, we receive
cit|πt<πmin = ((1− χgit+1)(1− τ t)− ritθt)Xit, (5)
whereas the members of the ruling elite consume an equal share of the current budget surplus,
cRt|πt<πmin =
µ
τ t
Z 1
0
(1− χgit+1)Xitdi+ (α− σt)Xt
¶
/γ. (6)
In case of a successful insurrection (πt ≥ πmin), the revolters set the maximum tax rate and
appropriate the tax revenues as well as the aid payment. Since no further decisions are to be
taken in this period (and since Xit = Xt), producer i’s consumption level is given by
cit|πt≥πmin = (1− τ)Xit + rit
µ
τ + α
πt
− θt
¶
Xit. (7)
The current ruler, by contrast, is no longer part of the game and receives a period utility of
zero from t onwards.
3 The Equilibrium
We now characterize the MPE under personal rule (Subsection 3.1) and discuss how equilibrium
policies under dictatorship deviate from those chosen under democracy (Subsection 3.2).
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3.1 The Equilibrium under Personal Rule
Focusing on the MPE, equilibrium strategies within each period can be determined by backward
induction. As a first step, guess that the size of the insurrection movement, πt, is a function
of θt such that πt ≥ πmin if θt lies below some cost level eθ, and πt < πmin otherwise. Under
these circumstances, we have an insurrection with probability p = F (eθ) in each period.
Equilibrium strategies following πt< πmin. Suppose now that there has not been an
insurrection in the period under consideration, and hence let us start with the producers’
investment decision. At the time of the decision, a producer knows the tax rate, τ t|πt<πmin ,
and the level of public spending, σt|πt<πmin . To determine the optimal level of technology
adoption, suppose that producer i’s value function is of the form
V (Xit, θt) =
ln(Xit)
1− β +A(θt), (8)
where A is a constant which depends on the the state variable θt but not on Xit. Then,
remembering Xit+1 = (1 + git+1)Xit, the recursive formulation of the value function reads
V (Xit, θt)|πt<πmin = maxgit+1∈[0,σt/χ]
©
ln
¡
cit|πt<πmin
¢
+ βE {V ((1 + git+1)Xit, θt+1)}
ª
,
where cit|πt<πmin is defined in equation (5). Assuming rit = 0 (which turns out to be true if
πt < πmin), the solution to the above maximization problem is given by
git+1|πt<πmin = min
½
σt
χ
,
β
χ
− (1− β)
¾
≥ 0, (9)
where the inequality sign follows from Assumption (A2). The second term in the above equa-
tion, i.e., the expression for the unconstrained-optimal level of technology adoption, is quite
intuitive. Other things equal, the producers choose a low growth rate if χ is high; an increases in
cost of technology adoption rises the price of future productivity in terms of current consump-
tion and leads to a corresponding substitution eﬀect. Similarly, git+1|πt<πmin is small if the
individuals attach only a low weight to future consumption. Notice further that git+1|πt<πmin
is not aﬀected by the tax rate. Taxes are on net income (i.e., on income net of adoption costs)
and hence do not interfere with the producers’ incentives to invest.
When it comes to the decisions on taxes and productive public spending, the incumbent
ruler observes the producers’ optimal response to his decisions, git+1|πt<πmin . To solve the
regime’s optimization problem, assume that the upper bound on git+1|πt<πmin is never binding
in optimum so that, from the ruler’s perspective, equation (9) simplifies to git+1|πt<πmin =
σt/χ. Further, guess that the unchallenged ruler’s value function is given by
W (Xt) =
ln(Xt)
1− βR
+B, (10)
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where βR ≡ (1− p)β. The recursive formulation of W (Xt) can then be expressed as
W (Xt) = max
τt≤τ, σt≥0
©
ln(cRt|πt<πmin) + βRW ((1 + σt/χ)Xt)
ª
where cRt|πt<πmin is defined in equation (6). Since taxes do not distort the producers’ adoption
decision, we have τ t|πt<πmin = τ whereas the equilibrium funding of the judiciary is given by
σt|πt<πmin = max
½
0, βR
τ + α
1 + τ
− (1− βR)χ
¾
. (11)
So it turns out that, due to Assumption (A3), reducing equation (9) to git+1|πt<πmin = σt/χ
was indeed appropriate.
The insurrection condition. It remains to determine under which circumstances an
insurrection occurs. To do this, remember that each producer chooses his strategy given the
strategies of the other agents. Moreover, recall that a single producer is only of measure zero
and hence cannot influence the number of participants. Accordingly, a single producer takes
πt as given when weighing the value of participation against the value of staying away.8
With this in mind, we can infer that an insurrection is an equilibrium outcome whenever
the condition
τ + α
πmin
Xt ≥ θtXt, (12)
holds, i.e., whenever the maximum gross private gain of taking part exceeds the private cost.
The insurrection must then involve πt = min {(τ + α) /θt, 1} participating producers so that
the net benefit from taking part is exactly zero if πt < 1 and only positive if πt = 1. More
formally, with condition (12) satisfied, we have an equilibrium in which each producer i takes
part with probability uit = min {(τ + α) /θt, 1} and, as a result, the incumbent ruler is forced
out of oﬃce (implying σt = git+1 = 0). Note, however, that even though an insurrection is a
possible equilibrium outcome if condition (12) holds, there is a second equilibrium in which no
agent participates. In the remainder, we ignore this latter equilibrium and presume that an
insurrection takes place whenever the private cost is suﬃciently low.
Suppose now that condition (12) is violated. Then, in the only equilibrium, each producer
stays away with probability 1 so that πt = 0 and the ruler remains in power. As a consequence,
we see a successful uprising with probability
p = Pr
µ
θt ≤
τ + α
πmin
¶
= F
µ
τ + α
πmin
¶
(13)
in each period. Notice that equation (13) is consistent with our initial guess, p = F (eθ), whereeθ is defined to be (τ + α)/πmin. Clearly, other things equal, the probability of an insurrection
8See Section 5 for a modification of the baseline model in which the insurgents act as a single agent and so
take into account that an insurrection induces a period of economic stagnation.
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rises in the resources which can be appropriated by the insurgents, and foreign aid contributes
one-to-one to this “booty.” Similarly, holding τ + α fixed, the probability of an uprising is
higher if the ruler is politically weak, i.e., if the cost of participating is frequently low or if the
minimum number of participation agents is only small.
Equilibrium strategies are now described, and we demonstrate in the appendix that the form
of the producers’ and the ruler’s value functions correspond to those assumed in equations (8)
and (10), respectively. The following proposition summarizes the main results so far.
Proposition 1 There exists a MPE such that for all t, (i) if θt ≤ (τ+α)/πmin, an insurrection
takes place (implying that σt = git+1 = 0 and τ t = τ); (ii) if θt > (τ + α)/πmin, the ruler
remains in power, sets a tax rate of τ , and chooses public spending, σt, according to equation
(11); the producers’ investment into future technology, git+1, is then given by σt/χ.
It is the purpose of Section 4 below to analyze how foreign aid aﬀects equilibrium institu-
tional quality and, through this channel, long-run economic performance.
3.2 A Democratic Equilibrium
We now briefly determine levels of income taxation and public spending preferred by the
producers. Intuitively, these values would materialize in equilibrium if the political system
were a democracy in which the producers (rather than a ruler) determined economic policies.
Below, it will be interesting to compare the democracy-outcome to the equilibrium policies
chosen under personal rule.
The equilibrium under democracy. Consider an economy that departs from the above
assumptions in one important dimension. The policies τ t and σt are determined through
majoritatiran voting and not by a dictator with access to public revenues. We start again
by characterizing equilibrium strategies following πt < πmin. Guess that the producers’ value
function, V D (Xit, θt) , is of the form ln(Xit)(1−β)−1+AD(θt) and thus is qualitatively similar
to that assumed in equation (8). Then, it is clear that the producers’ optimal level of technology
adoption is also given by equation (9).
The next step is to determine the producers’ optimal policy choice, (τ∗t , σ
∗
t ) . Again assuming
that the upper bound on git+1|πt<πmin is not binding in equilibrium (and hence git+1|πt<πmin =
σt/χ), the recursive formulation of producer i’s decision problem reads
V D(Xit, θt)
¯¯
πt<πmin
= max
τt, σt
©
ln ((1− σt)Xit (1− τ t)) + βE
©
V D ((1 + σt/χ)Xit, θt+1)
ªª
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subject to the state’s budget constraint τ t(1 − σt)Xt = σtXt. Solving this problem yields
σ∗t = β/2− (1− β)χ and τ∗t = σ∗t /(1− σ∗t ). It is clear that σ∗t can only be implemented if τ is
suﬃciently large; accordingly, the equilibrium funding of the judiciary, σDt
¯¯
πt<πmin
, is given by
σDt
¯¯
πt<πmin
= min
½
τ
(1 + τ)
,
β
2
− (1− β)χ
¾
, (14)
suggesting that our initial guesses and assumptions were indeed justified (the insurrection
condition is unchanged).
Personal rule vs. democracy. We now discuss how an incumbent ruler’s investment
into the judicial system diﬀers from that under democracy. This type of analysis provides
us with a coherent explanation for why countries under personal rule (and without external
assistance) may fail to achieve the growth rates known from many democracies.
Suppose first that threats of insurrection are absent (and hence βR = β). Figure 1 shows
public spending in this situation as a function of τ in the dictatorial regime (equation 11) and
under democracy (equation 14).
Figure 1 here
Apparently, for any value of τ except 1, the ruler prefers a lower level of productive spending
than a representative producer does. The under-investment in the dictatorship-regime is due to
the fact that the ruler can only capture a small fraction of the aggregate output while ”bearing”
the entire cost of higher future output. Compared to democracy-case, a given increase in
public spending (i.e., a given improvement of productivity) under personal rule induces a
larger relative reduction in the decisive agent’s consumption level and, as a consequence, leads
to a larger reduction in the agent’s utility from current consumption. So, when balancing the
current utility loss from lower consumption against the future benefits, the ruler chooses a
lower level of public spending in absolute terms. More intuitively, a low ability to raise taxes
has a larger negative impact on public spending under personal rule since the ruler perceives a
low ”return” in case he can only appropriate a small fraction of the additional future output.9
Public investment is even entirely absent for a broad range of lower levels of τ and starts
rising only after the state’s economic strength has reached some threshold level. Eventually, if
τ approaches 1, σt|πt<πmin catches up with the democracy-level because then the full return
accrues to the dictator.
9To make this intuition more explicit, note that the ruler’s optimization problem can be restated as
max
cRt,Xt+1
?
ln cRt + βW ( ?Xt+1)
?
s.t. ?Xt+1 = ?Xt +
?
τ ?Xt − cRt
?
/(χ(1 + τ)), where ?Xt ≡ Xt/γ. Using this
formulation, we can interpret the term τXt as the ruler’s ”perceived production function.” Obviously then,
with a low τ, the ruler perceives a low return of investing into productivity.
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Note further that, as compared to the democracy-case, the ruler’s incentives to provide
growth-promoting institutions are even lower if the citizens have access to a technology of
insurrection. Then, the ruler may not at all benefit from today’s investment (which pays-oﬀ
only tomorrow) because he his forced out of power with a positive probability. Accordingly, he
substitutes towards current consumption, other things equal. The producers do not respond
in this way since their time-horizon is unaﬀected by instability.
The model’s implication that economically weak states may strongly fail to enhance private
economic activity through the provision of ”good” institutions is consistent with what has been
observed by many political scientists. However, as in Acemoglu (2005), the main mechanism
through which limited power to tax leads to low levels of public goods provision is more subtle
here. It is not that the regime could not finance better institutions. The reason for excessively
low productive public spending is that the ruler has only little incentives to provide sound
institutions if his ability to squeeze out taxes from the economy is low.
4 Foreign Aid, Institutional Quality, and Growth
This section analyzes the impact of foreign aid on the ruler’s incentives to invest into growth-
promoting institutions (Subsection 4.1) and derives policy implications (Subsection 4.2).
4.1 A Non-monotonic Relationship between Aid and Growth
To disentangle the diﬀerent channels through which aid may aﬀect the ruler’s behavior, suppose
first that the private cost of rioting is infinitively high in each period so that an impact of foreign
assistance on the ruler’s time horizon is precluded.
Aid eﬀectiveness without threats of insurrection. Without a technology of insurrec-
tion, βR = β is simply a constant and it follows directly from equation (11) that the equilibrium
spending on the judicial system is weakly increasing in α.
This policy improvement is due to an income eﬀect ; with positive aid payments, the ruler
perceives a higher period income, and, since both current consumption and the productivity
level in the following period are ”normal goods”, he spends part of the additional resources
productively. It may be, though, that small aid flows are ineﬀective; this is the case if the gov-
ernments ability to raise taxes is particularly low so that, in absence of foreign aid, the ruler
chooses not to fund the judiciary at all because marginal utility from current consumption is
high (as compared to the benefit from stimulating growth). Under these circumstances, addi-
tional income is fully consumed up to some point; but a positive impact of external assistance
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can nonetheless be observed after the aid flow has reached a certain magnitude.
To sum up, if the ruler is highly entrenched from the citizens, suﬃciently large amounts of
foreign aid induce even a kleptocratic regime to improve institutional quality and hence the
economy’s growth performance.
Aid eﬀectiveness with threats of insurrection. We now turn to the more interesting
case in which the incumbent ruler may be forced out of power along the equilibrium path. As
a first step, it is convenient to parameterize the distribution function of the private costs of
rioting as F (x) = ρH(xπmin), where H(x) is a continuous distribution function with a finite
density h(x) for all x > 0.10 Hence, the probability of a successful insurrection is given by
p(τ + α) = F
µ
τ + α
πmin
¶
= ρH(τ + α). (12’)
Note that ρ is a natural measure for the ruler’s political strength. A lower ρ corresponds to
a situation in which the ruler is more entrenched since the cost of replacing him is frequently
high or a large fraction of the population is required to force him out of power.
It is now immediately transparent that in case the producers have access to a technology
of insurrection there is an additional channel through which foreign aid may aﬀect the ruler’s
behavior. With more government resources to be appropriated, the private benefit of taking
part in an insurrection is higher so that, other things equal, the incumbent regime faces a
higher probability of being forced out of oﬃce in the following period. Clearly, this political
instability eﬀect lowers the ruler’s incentives to fund growth promoting institutions; with a
lower probability of capturing the returns from today’s investment, it is optimal to substitute
towards current consumption. Hence, while the income eﬀect discussed above has a positive
impact on bσt|πt<πmin , the political instability eﬀect goes in the opposite direction.
In order to determine the net eﬀect of foreign aid on institutional quality, it is convenient
to discuss in a first step some properties of the function
ϑ(α) ≡ βR
τ + α
1 + τ
− (1− βR)χ (15)
= β (1− p(τ + α))
µ
τ + α
1 + τ
+ χ
¶
− χ,
which gives σt|πt<πmin in case of an interior solution (equation 11). The second line in equation
(15) can be derived by remembering βR = β (1− p(τ + α)) and rearranging terms.
10More formally, we should write ?Fρ(x) = min
?
ρF (xπmin), 1
?
, but the min-operator is omitted for notational
convenience.
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Lemma 1 (i) The function ϑ has a unique maximum over the domain [0, 1]. (ii) Define
α∗ ≡ argmax
α∈[0,1]
ϑ(α). Then, we have
ϑ(α∗) > 0 (16)
if ρ is suﬃciently low, i.e., if the ruler is suﬃciently entrenched.
Proof. See Appendix.
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 1 we see that, given τ and χ, the funding of the
judicial system,σt|rt=0 , is identical zero if the ruler’s political strength is too low (i.e., if ρ
exceeds some threshold level). In this case, foreign aid has no impact whatsoever on the ruler’s
behavior. The reason is intuitive; under these circumstances, even at low levels of α, the
probability of being replaced is so high (and gets actually higher if α increases) that it never
pays to establish costly ”good” institutions. Things are diﬀerent, however, if it is more diﬃcult
to force an incumbent regime out of power.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the ruler is suﬃciently entrenched so that condition (16) holds.
Then, as shown in Figure 2, the relationship between foreign aid, α, and the funding of growth-
promoting institutions, σt|πt<πmin , is hump-shaped.
Formally, we have
d σt|πt<πmin
dα
⎧
⎨
⎩
≥ 0
< 0
:
:
α ≤ α∗
α > α∗
,
where α∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The claim follows directly from equation (11) and Lemma 1.
The reason for this non-monotonicity is that the political instability eﬀect becomes stronger
as α increases. At lower levels of α, i.e., if political instability is only moderate, we observe a
small impact of higher instability on the ruler’s marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between
future productivity and current consumption;11 accordingly, the income eﬀect dominates the
instability eﬀect. However, as government revenues (and hence instability) increase, the eﬀect
of even higher revenues (and thus even more pronounced instability) on MRS gets larger so
that the positive income eﬀect is dominated by the instability eﬀect if α exceeds some threshold
level.
Figure 2 here
It is now interesting to analyze how the location of the peak is aﬀected by the parameters
ρ, τ , and χ which characterize key aspects of the country’s political and economic systems.
11Formally, for given values of cRt and ?Xt+1, the impact of a higher probability of being replaced on the
marginal rate of substitution is given by ∂MRScRt, ?Xt+1/∂p = −(
?Xt+1/cRt)/(β(1− p)2).
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Proposition 3 Suppose that the ruler is suﬃciently entrenched so that condition (16) holds.
Then, the level beyond which aid is harmful for institutional quality, α∗, is the higher (i) the
more the ruler is entrenched; (ii) the lower the state’s capacity to tax; (iii) the less expensive
technology adoption.
Formally, we have
∂α∗(ρ, τ , χ)
∂ρ
≤ 0, ∂α
∗(ρ, τ , χ)
∂τ
≤ 0, and ∂α
∗(ρ, τ , χ)
∂χ
≤ 0,
with strict inequality if α∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
If the ruler is politically strong (i.e., with a low ρ), the probability of an insurrection
rises only weakly in α so that the instability eﬀect, i.e., the adverse impact of instability on
the ruler’s marginal rate of substitution, becomes influential only at high levels of external
assistance. Similarly, if the state is economically weak (i.e., with a low τ), the likelihood of
an insurrection in absence of aid is low so that the income eﬀect dominates over a broader
range. Further, if the cost of technology adoption is low (i.e., with a low χ), the ruler spends a
larger fraction of the additional resources productively, other things equal. So, once again, the
instability eﬀect starts to dominate only at a high level. The comparative static results with
respect to ρ and τ are illustrated in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3 here
Finally note that the scope for beneficial foreign aid is even smaller if we focus on the
economy’s long-run growth rate rather than at the funding of the judicial system in absence of
an insurrection. With higher aid payments, the insurrection equilibria are more numerous so
that the probability of a government shutdown (and hence a complete stagnation) is higher.
Formally, the economy’s average (long-run) growth rate is given by
E {gt+1} = (1− p(α+ τ))
σt|πt<πmin
χ
,
and it is immediately clear that the above expression peaks at a lower level of α than σt|πt<πmin .
4.2 Policy Implications
This model relies on rather strong assumptions, and so it would be unwise to draw ultimate
policy conclusions. Nevertheless, the present analysis oﬀers some insights that might be inter-
esting for policy makers.
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More aid may be harmful. First, more foreign aid may make matters worse. Increasing
the level of assistance may actually decrease the funding of growth-promoting institutions and,
consequently, may hurt the economy’s growth performance. Such a negative correlation is
the more likely to emerge the lower the regime’s political strength, the stronger the state’s
ability to extract resources, and the more costly technology adoption. In practice, this could
mean that directing aid towards countries in which (more or less exogenous) conditions favor
insurgency may be problematic. Such conditions are, for instance, the presence of rough terrain
(possibly at a distance to the center of state power) which allows the insurgents to form their
movement without being destroyed at an early stage. The governments political strength may
also by undermined by the presence of hostile neighboring states which back anti-government
movements abroad.12 Similarly, foreign aid is less likely to achieve its goal in countries with an
economic structure that makes it easy to extract resources from the economy. Such a structural
factor may be a significant natural resource industry; fuels, minerals or cash crop are usually
exported through a few ports which can easily be controlled by the government. Finally, in
practice, aid is less likely to work well in countries with unfavorable geographic conditions. It
seems reasonable to expect technology adoption costs to rise in a country’s remoteness.
Note, however, that the present model does not predict aid ineﬀectiveness in general. It
rather points to the fact that, given some widespread characteristics of recipient countries, the
range in which budget assistance is beneficial economic performance may be narrow; it also
emphasizes that aid flows beyond this potentially narrow range can be harmful. Hence, in
the light of the present theory, it is hardly astonishing that the empirical literature fails to
find a clear positive or negative relationship between aid and economic policies or institutions
(e.g., Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Knack, 2001) or aid and long-run growth (e.g., Rajan and
Subramanian, 2005). Moreover, the paper provides a simple rationale for a hump-shaped
relationship between aid and growth; such a pattern has been observed in some recent empirical
studies (e.g., Daalgard et al., 2004).
Selectivity does not guarantee eﬀectiveness. The second insight concerns aid selec-
tivity. Allocation aid on the basis of the current institutional environment may not be a good
thing. Diﬀerences in the quality of institutions across recipient countries may simply reflect
diﬀerences in government revenues and do not necessarily predict whether additional revenues
will be used productively (because, for instance, the regime is suﬃciently entrenched so that
the instability eﬀect is absent). As illustrated by Figure 3, budget assistance, starting from
12See Fearon and Laitin (2003) for a comprehensive discussions of what determines the relative strength of
anti-government movements.
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zero, may have a positive impact in countries with particularly poor institutions while the
eﬀect may be negative in countries with a better working judicial system. Again, the model
may help to explain why - at least according to the most recent literature - there seems not to
be a robust link between aid eﬀectiveness and good policies or institutions (e.g., Hansen and
Tarp, 2001; Easterly et al., 2004).
Adoption subsidies may work better. Finally, the model’s third interesting insight is
that an alternative form of aid, the subsidization of technology adoption contracts, may work
better than aid in the form of budget assistance. For concreteness, suppose that the external
donor subsidizes an adoption contract with ξ∆Xit+1 units of the final good, where ξ < χ.
Hence, producer i’s net adoption cost is given by χnet∆Xit+1, where χnet ≡ (χ − ξ). Notice
that introducing this additional aid instrument does not alter the structure of the equations
derived above; so we can simply replace χ by χnet in the relevant formulas.
Equations (11) and (9) show that, in a no insurrection equilibrium, subsidizing technol-
ogy adoption tends to have a positive impact on σt|πt<πmin and on the implied growth rate,
σt|πt<πmin /χnet. The reason is a substitution eﬀect. With lower adoption costs, the price of
future productivity in terms of current consumption is lower so that the ruler tends to invest
more in growth promoting institutions.13
In terms of eﬀectiveness, there are two qualitative diﬀerences between the two forms of
aid. First, in the subsidy case, there always exists a level of assistance so that the incumbent
ruler spends a positive amount on contract enforcement. Second, the relationship between
σt|πt<πmin and the adoption subsidy is monotonic. The reason behind these two diﬀerences
lies in the missing instability eﬀect in the subsidy case. In the present framework, making
technology adoption cheaper does not provide additional resources that can be appropriated
by the revolters; the incentive to take part in an insurrection is unaﬀected and so is the
probability of an insurrection equilibrium. Hence, there is no negative eﬀect of foreign aid on
the ruler’s discount factor.
5 The Insurgents as a Single Actor
In this section, we briefly modify the baseline model regarding the technology of insurrection.
Here, we treat the insurgents as a single actor who can decide whether an insurrection takes
place or not. In such a setting, the decisive agent has to observe that, in an insurrection
13Thus, the ruler’s reaction to lower adoption costs is perfectly consistent with Demsetz’ (1967, p. 350)
conjecture that ”the emergence of (· · ·) property rights takes place in response to the desires of the interaction
persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities.”
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period, investment into future productivity is not possible because the current government is
shut down (and hence λt = σt = 0). In the baseline set-up, by contrast, a single agent needs
not to take this “stagnation cost” into account because his individual decision is not pivotal.
It turns out that - with some qualifications - the baseline model’s main results go through even
if the decisive agent internalizes the loss associated with economic stagnation. In particular,
aid eﬀectiveness may be low (or even negative) due to an associated instability eﬀect.
Suppose that in each period a group of insurgents of measure π < χ has the power to
force the incumbent ruler out of oﬃce and to appropriate current state revenues, (α + τ)Xt.
Henceforth, we refer to this group as the ”insurgent.” The insurgent’s decision is denoted by
rt ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 indicating an uprising. For expositional convenience, assume further that
0 < α+ τ ≤ 1 and θt ∼ U [1, 1/f ]. All other assumptions remain unchanged.
To characterize the MPE, guess that in equilibrium the probability of an insurrection, p, is
constant over time and that the value functions are of the same form as in the baseline model
(which will turn out later on). This implies that the policy functions (9) and (11), i.e., the
optimal actions in the no insurrection equilibrium, do not change either. Then, in a given
period t, an insurrection takes place if the insurgent’s net value from such an event,
∆ ≡ ln
µ∙
1− τ + α+ τ
π
− θt
¸
Xit
¶
+ βE
½
ln(Xit)
1− β + C
¾
− ln((1− χ git+1|rt=0)(1− τ)Xit) + βE
½
ln(1 + git+1|rt=0Xit)
1− β + C
¾
,
is positive, i.e., if θt is suﬃciently low so that the net “booty,” ((α+ τ)/π − θt)Xit, outweighs
the stagnation cost (i.e., git+1|rt=1 = 0). Assume further that there is constant level of θ, denote
it by bθ, below which an insurrection is optimal so that p = F (bθ). Then, after rearranging terms
in the above equation, we get
∆(θt,bθ) = lnÃ 1− τ + α+τπ − θt
(1− χ git+1|rt=0)(1− τ)
!
− β
1− β ln(1 + git+1|rt=0) (17)
≡ Λ(θt,bθ)− Ω(bθ).
Note that ∆ depends on both the current realization of θ but also on the threshold level bθ. The
latter arguments feeds in via the growth rate in the no insurrection equilibrium, git+1|rt=0 =
σt|rt=0 /χ which is in turn aﬀected by βR = (1− F (bθ))β. The following proposition relies on
equation (17) to characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose that in each period an insurgent decides on removing the incumbent
ruler from oﬃce. Then, there exists a MPE such that for all t, (i) if θt ≤ bθ, an insurrection
takes place (implying that σt = git+1 = 0 and τ t = τ); (ii) if θt > bθ, the ruler remains in
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power, sets a tax rate of τ , and chooses public spending, σt, according to equation (11); the
producers’ investment into future technology, git+1, is then given by σt/χ.
The threshold level bθ is strictly positive and implicitly determined by Λ(bθ,bθ) = Ω(bθ) if
β <
1 + χ
2 + χ+ π
, (18)
and a suﬃcient condition for bθ to be unique is then that f lies below some threshold level.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that restriction (18) is suﬃcient but not necessary. The condition is more likely
to be satisfied if, other things equal, β or π are relatively low or if χ is relatively high. The
intuition is as follows. With a low β and a high χ, technology adoption is less attractive
because additional future income has a low weight or because technology adoption is expensive.
Accordingly, provided that the direct cost of an insurrection is small enough, the “booty” is
suﬃciently large to compensate for the stagnation cost. Similarly, if π is small, the insurgent’s
benefit per capita is higher which makes an insurrection more rewarding, other thins equal.
The next step is now to see how foreign aid aﬀects equilibrium political instability and,
eventually, economic performance.
Proposition 5 Suppose that in each period an insurgent decides on removing the incumbent
ruler from oﬃce. Assume further that condition (18) holds and bθ is unique. Then, foreign aid
in the form of budget assistance increases bθ and hence rises the probability of an insurrection.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5’s basic message is that an increase in foreign budget assistance may be ac-
companied by a surge in political instability even if the insurgents take into account that the
unchallenged ruler would spend part of the additional resources productively. If technology
adoption is not too attractive, aid unambiguously increases the incentives for an uprising. The
conclusion is that Section 4’s main result applies also in this modified set-up. Aid eﬀective-
ness may be strongly undermined through an aid-induced instability eﬀect which shortens the
ruler’s time horizon in oﬃce and, through this channel, depletes his incentives to finance sound
economic institutions.
6 Some Evidence on Foreign Aid and Instability
The purpose of this section is to provide some suggestive evidence supporting the hypothesis
that the small or even negative impact of aid on macroeconomic performance may be due to
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a political instability eﬀect. Specifically, we assess whether foreign aid shortens an incumbent
regime’s time-horizon in oﬃce by fueling insurrections and coups.
6.1 Specification and Data
To test for an association between political instability and foreign aid, we use a first-diﬀerence
(fixed-eﬀect) panel data model. Specifically, assume that political instability, instit, is deter-
mined according to the linear regression equation
instit = a(aid/GNI)it + b0Vit + c0Wi + dt+ eit,
where i is the country index and t denotes a particular decade. In total, we observe two decades,
the 1980s (t = 0) and the 1990s (t = 1). The vector V contains time-varying determinates of
political instability other than the aid-to-GNI ratio while vector W is included to capture
invariant influences.14 The linear time-trend is represented by dt, and the error term, e, is
assumed to satisfy the usual conditions. All time-dependent control variables are calculated as
an average over the relevant decade.
As a proxy for the dependent variable, inst, we use the number of illegal or forced changes
in the top governmental elite per ten years. This measure can easily be constructed based on
information form the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Moreover, it has the advantage
of being highly comparable over time and seems to be appropriate to assess the relevance of
our story. That is, it allows to test whether foreign aid shortens a regime’s expected time-span
in oﬃce by rising the number of successful insurrections and coups. The main independent
variable, aid/GNI, measures net oﬃcial foreign aid from all donors (i.e., bilateral and multi-
lateral) relative to the country’s GNI. The ratio contains all types of foreign assistance since
aid tends to be fungible (and hence can at least partially be appropriated by the regime or
by insurgents) irrespective of the exact purpose or form. The data comes from the OECD
Development Co-operation Directorate.
The set of the additional time-dependent determinants consists of the GDP per capita, a
measure for democracy, and the inflation rate. By including these further controls we refer to
a large body of empirical literature primarily in political science that tries to identify the de-
terminants of insurrections, revolutions, and civil wars (see MacCulloch, 2004, pp. 830-2, for a
short survey). The GDP per capita is often seen to influence the government’s (relative) capa-
bility of counterinsurgency. There are two competing hypotheses. Some scholars believe poorer
14As discussed in the previous section, such fixed factors may be the presence (or absence) of rough terrain,
hostile neighboring states, or valuable natural resources.
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countries to be more vulnerable to insurgency because the regimes in such places - financially
weak - are probably restricted to comparatively crude repression technologies; the alternative
hypothesis is that a higher GDP per capita rises the insurgents’ resources in a disproportion-
ate way so that a successful insurrection become more likely. Accordingly, the literature oﬀers
no clear prediction in which direction the influence of income goes. The democracy index is
included since democratic institutions may be able to channel (and eventually respond to)
grievances of disadvantaged groups. Hence, revolutionary pressure should, other things equal,
be lower if institutions allow for broad participation in the political process (as opposed to elite
rule). High inflation, by contrast, is expected to foster the taste for revolt. The hypothesis is
that the inflation rate is seen as a performance indicator; substantial price-instability is taken
to proxy for a low quality of government and hence may erode the regime’s legitimacy in the
eyes of the many.
Tables 1 and 2 here
Exact data definitions and sources for all the relevant variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 2 reports summary statistics.
6.2 Endogeneity Problems
As extensively discussed in the literature, the aid-to-GNI ratio is likely to be endogenous.
The donors’ aid allocation is almost certainly aﬀected by political instability in the receiving
countries. On the one hand, if aid allocation is merit-based, the donors may find that instable
countries do not deserve substantial assistance. In this case, a possible positive impact of
foreign aid on political instability would be biased downward. On the other hand, donors may
perceive instability to create needs by deteriorating economic performance so that a causal
impact of foreign aid would be overstated. To deal with this problem, we have to instrument
for the endogenous actual aid-to-GNI ratio. In the regressions below, we use the instrument
constructed by Rajan and Subramanian (2005) as an exogenous source of variation in foreign
assistance.15 This instrument gives the exogenous component of total assistance as a share
of the GDP. To isolate the exogenous part, Rajan and Subramanian exploit the fact that aid
flows are often influenced by factors that are rather independent of contemporaneous economic
and political events; such factors include common membership in an alliance or colonial ties
between the donor and the recipient country, for instance.
Serious concerns of endogeneity arise also with respect to the other explanatory variables.
15We are grateful to Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian for sharing their data with us.
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The GDP per capita needs instrumentation since we may simply observe a negative correla-
tion between political instability and income due to the direct negative impact of conflict on
economic activity; the inflation rate may be endogenous for the same reason. Similarly, it may
be that frequent insurgencies induce the incumbent government to move towards more democ-
racy to soften revolutionary pressure. To deal with this problems in our first-diﬀerence panel
data model, we use a procedure originally proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). That is,
we exploit the levels in the second half of the 1970s to instrument for the subsequent changes
(from the 1980s to the 1990s) in these additional explanatory variables.16
6.3 Estimation Results
Our estimation results are shown in Table 3. The first two columns give the baseline specifi-
cation with the aid-to-GNI ratio and the GDP per capita as independent variables. In column
(1), we do not instrument for the two regressors but run a simple OLS-estimation; it turns out
that both coeﬃcients are statistically insignificant. Things change, however, when the (po-
tential) endogeneity of the explanatory variables is taken into account. The basic IV-results
are presented in column (2). Foreign assistance has now a significant positive impact on po-
litical instability. Most likely, this diﬀerence reflects the negative feedback eﬀect of instability
on the donors’ aid allocation which biases the simple OLS-result downwards. The destabiliz-
ing eﬀect of foreign aid is quite sizable; increasing oﬃcial development assistance from 0% to
10% of the GNI (which corresponds to 1 standard deviation in the 1980s) rises the number
of illegal or forced government changes (or any attempt at such changes) by 2.3 per 10 years.
The influence of the GDP per capita, by contrast, remains insignificant even with appropriate
instrumentation. Similarly, we do not observe a significant decade-specific eﬀect.
Table 3 here
In column (3) and (4) we introduce step-by-step the two remaining explanatory variables
(with appropriate instrumentation). As expected, the democracy index enters the regression
equation with a negative sign (column 3). Moreover, the eﬀect of democracy on political
stability is marginally significant and quite large; pushing a country from a low standard of
democracy (e.g., the Haitian level) to a high level (e.g., the South African level) would reduce
16The levels are by construction correlated with the subsequent changes but political instability in the 1980s
and 1990s cannot influence the levels of income, inflation, and democracy in the 1970. Hence, the levels seem
to be appropriate instruments for the subsequent changes in these variables. Note that in case of inflation we
have to use the average level from 1980 to 1984 since that of the second half of the 1970s is a weak instrument.
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the number of revolutionary acts by 3 per 10 years. Finally, again consistent with expectations,
the coeﬃcient on inflation (which is taken to reflect the quality of government) is positive and
statistically highly significant (column 4). Yet, as compared to the other explanatory variables,
the magnitude of the eﬀect is smaller; increasing inflation by 1 standard deviation (i.e., by 220
percentage points) goes together with an additional 0.5 revolutions per 10 years.17
Note, finally, that the introduction of these additional explanatory variables does not reduce
the impact of foreign assistance on the number of coups and insurrections; the coeﬃcient on
the aid-to-GNI ratio becomes even larger. In this sense, the present evidence points to a robust
eﬀect of aid on instability.
7 Summary and Conclusions
We analyze the impact of foreign aid on economic performance in an economy that may grow
through the adoption of more productive technologies. The role of the state is to enforce
contracts between foreign technology suppliers and domestic firms; a higher funding of the
judiciary translates into better enforcement and, through this channel, allows for faster growth.
The self-interested government, however, is weak in the sense that its power is permanently
threatened through insurrections; moreover, it has only a limited capacity to tax - a stylized
fact that has often been blamed as an important obstacle to economic development.
We find that in such an environment foreign aid may fail to promote better institutions and
a higher growth rate. The paper thus provides a possible explanaiton for the lack of a robust
empirical relationship between aid and economic performance. The mechanism highlighted here
is that - with insuﬃcient checks on the government’s behavior - large revenues are required
to make even a perfectly entrenched ruler willing to finance key economic institutions. The
dilemma is that providing such resources easily destabilizes the incumbent regime and hence
depletes its incentives to invest; large sums of money fuel distributional conflicts and shorten
the regime’s time-horizon in oﬃce.
Besides accounting for low aid eﬀectiveness, the present set-up may add to an explanation
for additional empirical findings. First, it turns out that the instability eﬀect gets dispropor-
tionately strong as the aid level rises. So the model can account for decreasing returns to
17Without instrumentation, the coeﬃcients on democracy and inflation are given by −0.161 and 0.0359,
respectively (results not reported in the table). So, it appears the two variables’ endogenous response to
political instability biases the causal impact of democracy downward (since threatened regimes democratize
to mitigate revolutionary pressure, for instance) and that of inflation upward (because of the direct negative
impact of conflict on economic activity).
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aid which have been found in some recent studies. Second, the model highlights that current
institutional quality does not predict aid eﬀectiveness. An (additional) inflow of resources, by
lifting political instability above some critical level, may be harmful in an economy which has
performed relatively well. Yet, such an inflow is probably highly eﬀective in a country suﬀering
from low institutional quality. In this light, it is less surprising that the literature does not
find a robust empirical link between aid eﬀectiveness and institutional quality.
From a policy perspective, the present model oﬀers three interesting insights. First, in-
creasing transfers may not only be ineﬀective but may actually hurt a country’s long-run
performance. According to the model, such a negative impact is more likely to emerge if in-
surgency is favored through, e.g., rough terrain or hostile neighboring states; if government
revenues are already high because a strong natural resource sector facilitates taxation; or if
the country’s remoteness renders technology adoption expensive. The second insight is that
institutional quality reacts endogenously to aid inflows so that current conditions do not nec-
essarily predict whether additional resources will be used eﬀectively. Hence, allocating aid on
the basis of current institutions or policies — which lies at the heart of the selectivity concept
— may simply pick the “wrong” recipient countries. Finally, the model points to an alternative
form of aid which can be expected to work more reliably. Making access to more productive
technologies cheaper (by subsidizing licensing fees, for instance) may be a way to spur economic
growth even in a bad institutional environment.
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Appendix
Form of the value functions. We show that the producers’ value function under personal
rule, V (Xit), is indeed of the form assume in equation (8). The guesses of all other value
functions can be verified in a similar way.
Given the form of the policy functions (9) and (11), and given the fact that an insurrection
takes place if (τ + α)/πmin ≥ θt, we can write the equilibrium level of technology adoption,
git+1, as a function of θt and the parameters of the model,
git+1(θt;α, β, πmin, τ , χ).
Then, according to equations (5) and (7), the producers’ consumption level can be written as
a factor z times the current productivity level,
cit = z(θt;α, β, πmin, τ , χ)Xit.
This multiplicative expression can now be used in equation (1) to derive the form of V . Sup-
pressing the arguments in z and git+1 where appropriate, a producer’s value function can be
expressed as
V = E
( ∞X
s=0
βs ln (z(θt+s)Xit+s)
)
= E
( ∞X
s=0
βs ln (Xit+s)
)
+ ln z(θt) + β
E {z}
1− β .
Further, exploiting the fact that Xit+s = Xit(1 + git+1) · · · (1 + git+s) yields
V (Xit, θt) =
ln(Xit)
1− β + ln z(θt) + β
ln(1 + git+1(θt))
1− β + β
E {z}
1− β
+E
©
β2 ln(1 + git+2) + β
3 ln((1 + git+2)(1 + git+3)) + · · ·
ª
≡ ln(Xit)
1− β +A(θt),
which corresponds to the assumptions made in equation (8).
Proof of Lemma 1. The first claim can immediately be seen by looking at the first deriva-
tive,
dϑ
dα
=
β
1 + τ
(1− ρH(τ + α))
µ
1− ρh(τ + α)
1− ρH(τ + α) (τ + α+ χ(1 + τ))
¶
,
which is monotonically decreasing in α since the monotone hazard rate assumptions imposed
on the distribution function F carriers over to ρH(τ + α).
With respect to the second claim, note that, by Assumption (A2), β ((τ + α) /(1 + τ) + χ)−
χ is strictly positive if α is suﬃciently close to 1; hence we can always find a value of ρ which
is suﬃciently close to 0 so that βR ((τ + α) /(1 + τ) + χ)− χ = ϑ(α) is also strictly positive.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose first that α∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then, since the monotone hazard
rate condition holds, it follows from the first-order condition
dϑ
dα
= 0⇔
µ
1− ρh(τ + α
∗)
1− ρH(τ + α∗) ((τ + α
∗ + χ(1 + τ))
¶
= 0,
that the partial derivatives, ∂α∗/∂ρ, ∂α∗/∂τ and ∂α∗/∂χ, must be strictly negative.
Consider now the corner solutions. If dϑ/dα|α=1 > 0 and hence α∗ = 1, a marginal increase
in ρ, τ , or χ leaves α∗ unaﬀected since argmaxϑ(α) > 1. Note, however, that argmaxϑ(α)
falls in ρ, τ , and χ so that the case α∗ ≤ 1 becomes relevant at some point. Similar arguments
apply for the case α∗ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove the first claim, we have to show the existence of a bθ such
that ∆(θt,bθ) > 0 if θt < bθ and ∆(θt,bθ) ≤ 0 if θt ≥ bθ implying that an insurrection takes place
with a constant probability p = F (bθ) in each period. Then, the guesses of the value functions
were correct, and using the policy functions (9) and (11) was appropriate so that the set of
strategies described in the proposition is indeed a MPE.
To proceed, notice an important property of ∆(θt,bθ). We have ∂∆(θt,bθ)/∂θt < 0 since
∂Λ(θt,bθ)/∂θt < 0. Hence, it is clear that the condition
∆(bθ,bθ) = Λ(bθ,bθ)− Ω(bθ) = 0
implicitly defines possible values of bθ, and it remains to characterize the solution(s) to this
condition. It is convenient to treat two diﬀerent constellations separately. Suppose first that
∆(0, 0) > 0. Under this condition, it follows from the properties of the functions Λ(bθ,bθ) and
Ω(bθ) that there is at least one solution to Λ(bθ,bθ)−Ω(bθ) = 0 over the range (0, 1−τ+(α+ τ) /π].
Suppose now that ∆(0, 0) ≤ 0. Then, a possible value of bθ is given by 0, and there may be
other values satisfying Λ(bθ,bθ)− Ω(bθ) = 0 over the range (0, 1− τ + (α+ τ) /π]. Accordingly,
the exists at least one bθ, and the first paragraph of the proposition follows.
In order to prove the second claim, we have to show that with θt = 0 the net benefit from
an insurrection is strictly positive if condition (18) holds. More formally, we have to show that
∆(0, 0) > 0 or, equivalently, that Λ(0, 0) > Ω(0) if β < (1+χ)(2+χ+π)−1. To do this, notice
that
Λ(0, 0) > eΛ ≡ lnµ1 + α+ τ
π
¶
and Ω(0) < eΩ ≡ β
1− β ln
µ
1 +
α+ τ
χ
¶
.
It is no easy to see that deΛ/d(α + τ) > deΩ/d(α + τ) if condition (18) is satisfied (and if
α+ τ ≤ 1). Accordingly, we have eΛ > eΩ and hence Λ(0, 0) > Ω(0).
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The third claim follows from
¯¯¯
dΩ/dbθ¯¯¯ ≤ (β/(1−β))(f/(1−F (bθ)) so that ¯¯¯dΩ/dbθ¯¯¯ < ¯¯¯dΛ/dbθ¯¯¯
if f is suﬃciently small. Then, since Λ(0, 0) > Ω(0), there is exactly one intersection of Λ(bθ,bθ)
and Ω(bθ) over the range (0, 1− τ + (α+ τ) /π].
Proof of Proposition 5. Restriction (18) implies that bθ is determined by Λ(bθ,bθ) = Ω(bθ).
Implicit diﬀerentiation of this latter condition yields
dbθ
dα
=
∂Λ
∂α −
∂Ω
∂α
−
³
∂Λ
∂?θ −
∂Ω
∂?θ
´ .
Since restriction (18) holds (and hence Λ(0, 0) > Ω(0)) and because there is a unique solution
to Λ(bθ,bθ) = Ω(bθ), the Λ−curve must intersect the Ω−line from above at the equilibrium value
of bθ. Hence, the denominator in the above expression is strictly positive. To determine the sign
of the numerator, notice that
∂Λ
∂α
≥ 1
(1− τ − bθ)π + τ + α and ∂Ω∂α ≤ β1− β 1(1 + τ)χ+ τ + α,
which makes it straightforward to verify that restriction (18) is suﬃcient to ensure ∂Λ/∂α >
∂Ω/∂α. Therefore, we have dbθ/dα > 0.
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(1
.2
80
7)
 
D
em
oc
ra
cy
 
 
 
-0
.4
94
2c
 
(0
.2
81
0)
 
-0
.5
80
9c
 
(0
.3
10
8)
 
In
fla
tio
n 
(Q
ua
lit
y 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t) 
 
 
 
0.
26
02
a  
(0
.1
02
8)
 
Ti
m
e 
tre
nd
 
0.
79
55
 
(0
.5
07
6)
 
0.
25
32
 
(0
.6
24
5)
 
2.
43
83
 
(1
.5
93
5)
 
1.
96
08
 
(1
.5
22
8)
 
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
94
 
83
 
81
 
68
 
R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
a  S
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 1
 p
er
ce
nt
 le
ve
l. 
b  S
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 5
 p
er
ce
nt
 le
ve
l. 
c  S
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t l
ev
el
. 
